Abstract-Mashup is a web technology that allows different service providers to flexibly integrate their expertise and to deliver highly customizable services to their customers. Data mashup is a special type of mashup application that aims at integrating data from multiple data providers depending on the user's request. However, integrating data from multiple sources brings about three challenges: 1) Simply joining multiple private data sets together would reveal the sensitive information to the other data providers.
INTRODUCTION
M ASHUP service is a web technology that combines information from multiple sources into a single web application. An example of a successful mashup application is the integration of real estate information into Google Maps [1] , which allows users to browse on the map for properties that satisfy their specified requirements. In this paper, we focus on data mashup, a special type of mashup application that aims at integrating data from multiple data providers depending on the service request from a user (a data recipient). An information service request could be a general count statistic task or a sophisticated data mining task such as classification analysis. Upon receiving a service request, the data mashup web application (mashup coordinator) dynamically determines the data providers, collects information from them through their web service interface, and then integrates the collected information to fulfill the service request. Further computation and visualization can be performed at the user's site or on the web application server. This is very different from a traditional web portal that simply divides a webpage or a website into independent sections for displaying information from different sources.
A data mashup application can help ordinary users explore new knowledge; it could also be misused by adversaries to reveal sensitive information that was not available before the mashup. In this paper, we study the privacy threats caused by data mashup and propose a service-oriented architecture and a privacy-preserving data mashup algorithm to securely integrate person-specific sensitive data from different data providers, wherein the integrated data still retains the essential information for supporting general data exploration or a specific data mining task.
The Challenges
The research problem presented in this paper was discovered in a collaborative project with a social network company, which focuses on the gay and lesbian community in North America. The problem can be generalized as follows: social network companies A and B observe different sets of attributes about the same set of individuals (members) identified by the common User ID, e.g., T A ðUID; Gender; SalaryÞ and T B ðUID; Job; AgeÞ. Every time a social network member visits another member's webpage, an advertisement is chosen to be displayed. Companies A and B want to implement a data mashup application that integrates their membership data, with the goal of improving their advertisement selection strategy. The analysis includes gathering general count statistics and building classification models [2] . In addition to companies A and B, other partnered advertising companies need access to the final mashup data. The solution presented in this paper is not limited only to the social networks sector but is also applicable to other similar data mashup scenarios. The challenges of developing the data mashup application are summarized as follows.
Challenge #1: Privacy concerns. The members are willing to submit their personal data to a social network company because they consider the company and its developed system to be trustworthy. Yet, trust to one party may not necessarily be transitive to a third party. Many agencies and companies believe that privacy protection means simply removing explicit identifying information from the released data, such as name, social security number, address, and telephone number. However, many previous works [3] , [4] show that removing explicit identifying information is insufficient. An individual can be re-identified by matching other attributes called quasi-identifiers (QID). The following example illustrates potential privacy threats. Example 1. Consider the membership data in Table 1 . Data Provider A and Data Provider B own data tables T A ðUID; Class; Sensitive; GenderÞ and T B ðUID; Class; Job; AgeÞ, respectively. Each row (record) represents a member's information. The two parties want to develop a data mashup service to integrate their membership data in order to perform classification analysis on the shared Class attribute with two class labels Y and N, representing whether or not the member has previously bought any items after following the advertisements on the social network websites. Let QID ¼ fJob; Gender; Ageg. After integrating the two tables (by matching the shared UID field), there are two types of privacy threats: Record linkage. If a record in the table is so specific that not many members match it, releasing the data may lead to linking the member's record and his/her sensitive value. Let s1 be a sensitive value in Table 1 . Suppose that the adversary knows the target member is a Mover and his age is 34. Hence, record #3, together with his sensitive value (s1 in this case), can be uniquely identified since he is the only Mover who is 34 years old.
Attribute linkage. If a sensitive value occurs frequently along with some QID attributes, then the sensitive information can be inferred from such attributes, even though the exact record of the member cannot be identified. Suppose the adversary knows that the member is a male (M) of age 34. In such case, even though there are two such records (#1 and #3), the adversary can infer that the member has sensitive value s1 with 100 percent confidence since both records contain s1.
Many privacy models, such as K-anonymity [3] , [4] , '-diversity [5] , and confidence bounding [6] , have been proposed to thwart privacy threats caused by record and attribute linkages in the context of relational databases owned by a single data provider. The traditional approach is to generalize the records into equivalence groups so that each group contains at least K records sharing the same qid value on the QID, and so that each group contains sensitive values that are diversified enough to disorient confident inferences. The privacy models can be achieved by generalizing domain values into higher level concepts and, therefore, more abstract concepts.
The data mashup problem further complicates the privacy issue because the data are owned by multiple parties. In addition to satisfying a given privacy requirement in the final mashup data, at any time during the process of generalization no data provider should learn more detailed information about any other data provider other than the data in the final mashup table. In other words, the generalization process must not leak more specific information other than the final mashup data. For example, if the final table discloses that a member is a Professional, then no other data providers should learn whether she is a Lawyer or an Accountant. There are two obvious yet incorrect approaches. The first one is mashup-then-generalize: first integrate the two tables and then generalize the mashup table using some single table anonymization methods [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] . This approach does not preserve privacy in the studied scenario because any data provider holding the mashup table will immediately know all private information of both data providers. The second approach is generalize-then-mashup: first generalize each table locally and then integrate the generalized tables. This approach fails to guarantee the privacy for a quasi-identifier that spans multiple tables. In the above example, the K-anonymity on (Gender, Job) cannot be achieved by the K-anonymity on each of Gender and Job separately.
Challenge #2: High dimensionality. The mashup data from multiple data providers usually contain many attributes. Enforcing traditional privacy models on high-dimensional data would result in significant information loss. As the number of attributes increases, more generalization is required in order to achieve K-anonymity even if K is small, thereby resulting in data useless for further analysis. This challenge, known as the curse of high dimensionality on K-anonymity, is confirmed by [8] , [11] , [12] . To overcome this bottleneck, we exploit one of the limitations of the adversary: in real-life privacy attacks, it is very difficult for an adversary to acquire all the information of a target victim because it requires nontrivial effort to gather each piece. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the adversary's prior knowledge is bounded by at most L values of the QID attributes. Based on this assumption, in this paper we extend the privacy model called LKC-privacy [13] , originally proposed for a single party scenario, to apply to a multiparty data mashup scenario.
The general intuition of LKC-privacy is to ensure that every combination of values in QID j QID with maximum length L in the data table T is shared by at least K records, and the confidence of inferring any sensitive values in S is not greater than C, where L, K, C are thresholds and S is a set of sensitive values specified by the data provider. LKCprivacy limits the probability of a successful record linkage to be 1=K and the probability of a successful attribute linkage to be C, provided that the adversary's prior knowledge does not exceed L. Table 2 shows an example of an anonymous table that satisfies ð2; 2; 50%Þ-privacy by generalizing the values from Table 1 according to the taxonomies in Fig. 1 . (The dashed curve can be ignored for now.) Every possible value of QID j with maximum length 2 in Table 2 (namely, QID 1 ¼ fJob; Genderg, QID 2 ¼ fJob; Ageg, and QID 3 ¼ fGender; Ageg) is shared by at least two records, and the confidence of inferring the sensitive value s1 is not greater than 50 percent. In contrast, enforcing traditional 2-anonymity with respect to QID ¼ fGender; Job; Ageg will require further generalization. For example, in order to make hP rofessional; M; ½30-60Þi satisfy traditional 2-anonymity, we may further generalize ½1-30Þ and ½30-60Þ to ½1-60Þ, resulting in much higher information utility loss.
Challenge#3: Information requirements. The data recipients want to obtain general count statistics from the mashup membership information. Also, they want to use the mashup data as training data for building a classification model on the Class attribute, with the goal of predicting the behavior of future members. One frequently raised question is: to avoid privacy concerns, why doesn't the data provider release the statistical data or a classifier to the data recipients? In many real-life scenarios, releasing data is preferable to releasing statistics for several reasons. First, the data providers may not have in-house experts to perform data mining. They just want to share the data with their partners. Second, having access to the data, data recipients are flexible to perform the required data analysis. It is impractical to continuously request data providers to produce different types of statistical information or to fine-tune the data mining results for research purposes for the data recipients.
Contributions
This paper is the first work that addresses all the aforementioned challenges in the context of mashup service. The contributions are summarized as follows.
Contribution #1. We identify a new privacy problem through a collaboration with the social networks industry and generalize the industry's requirements to formulate the privacy-preserving high-dimensional data mashup problem (Section 3). The problem is to dynamically integrate data from different sources for joint data analysis in the presence of privacy concerns.
Contribution #2. We present a service-oriented architecture (Section 4) for privacy-preserving data mashup in order to securely integrate private data from multiple parties. The generalized data have to be as useful as possible to data analysis. Generally speaking, the privacy goal requires anonymizing identifying information that is specific enough to pinpoint individuals, whereas the data analysis goal requires extracting general trends and patterns. If generalization is carefully performed, it is possible to anonymize identifying information while preserving useful patterns.
Contribution #3. Data mashup often involves a large volume of data from multiple data sources. Thus, scalability plays a key role in a data mashup system. After receiving a request from a data recipient, the system dynamically identifies the data providers and performs the data mashup. Experimental results (Section 5) on real-life data suggest that our method can effectively achieve a privacy requirement without compromising the information utility, and the proposed architecture is scalable to large data sets.
RELATED WORK
Information integration has been an active area of database research [15] , [16] . This literature typically assumes that all information in each database can be freely shared [17] . Secure multiparty computation (SMC) [18] , [19] , [20] , on the other hand, allows sharing of the computed result (e.g., a classifier), but completely prohibits sharing of data. An 
example is the secure multiparty computation of classifiers [21] , [22] , [23] . In contrast, the privacy-preserving data mashup problem studied in this paper allows data providers to share data, not only the data mining results. In many applications, data sharing gives greater flexibility than result sharing because the data recipients can perform their required analysis and data exploration [8] .
Samarati and Sweeney [24] propose the notion of K-anonymity. Datafly system [4] and -Argus system [25] use generalization to achieve K-anonymity. Preserving classification information in K-anonymous data is studied in [8] and [10] . Mohammed et al. [13] extend the work to address the problem of high-dimensional anonymization for the healthcare sector using LKC-privacy. All these works consider a single data source; therefore, data mashup is not an issue. Joining all private databases from multiple sources and applying a single table anonymization method fails to guarantee privacy if a QID spans across multiple private tables. Recently, Mohammed et al. [14] propose an algorithm to address the horizontal integration problem, while our paper addresses the vertical integration problem.
Jiang and Clifton [26] , [27] propose a cryptographic approach and Mohammed et al. [28] propose a top-down specialization algorithm to securely integrate two vertically partitioned distributed data tables to a K-anonymous table, and further consider the participation of malicious parties in [29] . Trojer et al. [30] present a service-oriented architecture for achieving K-anonymity in the privacypreserving data mashup scenario. Our paper is different from these previous works [26] , [27] , [28] , [29] , [30] in two aspects. First, our LKC-privacy model provides a stronger privacy guarantee than K-anonymity because K-anonymity does not address the privacy attacks caused by attribute linkages, as discussed in Section 1. Second, our method can better preserve information utility in high-dimensional mashup data. High dimensionality is a critical obstacle for achieving effective data mashup because the integrated data from multiple parties usually contain many attributes. Enforcing traditional K-anonymity on high-dimensional data will result in significant information loss. Our privacy model resolves the problem of high dimensionality. This claim is also supported by our experimental results.
Yang et al. [23] develop a cryptographic approach to learn classification rules from a large number of data providers while sensitive attributes are protected. The problem can be viewed as a horizontally partitioned data table in which each transaction is owned by a different data provider. The output of their method is a classifier, but the output of our method is an anonymous mashup data that supports general data analysis or classification analysis. Jurczyk and Xiong [31] , [32] present a privacy-preserving distributed data publishing for horizontally partitioned databases. The mashup model studied in this paper can be viewed as a vertically partitioned data table, which is very different from the model studied in [23] , [31] , and [32] .
Jackson and Wang [33] present a secure communication mechanism that enables cross-domain network requests and client-side communication with the goal of protecting the mashup controller from malicious code through web services. In contrast, this paper aims to preserve the privacy and information utility of the mashup data.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
We first define the LKC-privacy model [13] and the information utility measure on a single data table, then extend it for privacy-preserving high-dimensional data mashup from multiple parties.
Privacy Measure
Consider a relational data table T ðUID; D 1 ; . . . ; D m ; S 1 ; . . . ; S e ; ClassÞ (e.g., Table 1 ). UID is an explicit identifier, such as User ID or SSN. In practice, it should be replaced by a pseudo identifier, such as a record ID, before publication. We use UID to ease the discussion only. Each D i is either a categorical or numerical attribute. Each S j is a categorical sensitive attribute. A record has the form hv 1 ; . . . ; v m ; s 1 ; . . . ; s e ; clsi, where v i is a domain value in D i , s j is a sensitive value in S j , and cls is a class value in Class. The data provider wants to protect against linking an individual to a record or some sensitive value in T through some subset of attributes called a quasi-identifier QID fD 1 ; . . . ; D m g.
One data recipient, who is an adversary, seeks to identify the record or sensitive values of some target victim V in T . As explained in Section 1, we assume that the adversary knows at most L values of QID attributes of the victim. We use qid to denote such prior known values, where jqidj L. Based on the prior knowledge qid, the adversary could identify a group of records, denoted by T ½qid, that contains qid. jT ½qidj denotes the number of records in T ½qid. The adversary could launch two types of privacy attacks based on T ½qid.
. Record linkage. Given prior knowledge qid, T ½qid is a set of candidate records that contains the victim V s record. If the group size of T ½qid, denoted by jT ½qidj, is small, then the adversary may identify V s record from T ½qid and, therefore, V s sensitive value. For example, if qid ¼ hMover; 34i in Table 1 , T ½qid ¼ fUID#3g and jT ½qidj ¼ 1. Thus, the adversary can easily infer that V has sensitive value s1. . Attribute linkage. Given prior knowledge qid, the adversary can identify T ½qid and infer that V has sensitive value s with confidence P ðsjqidÞ ¼ jT ½qid^sj jT ½qidj , where T ½qid^s denotes the set of records containing both qid and s. P ðsjqidÞ is the percentage of the records in T ½qid containing s. The privacy of V is at risk if P ðsjqidÞ is high. For example, given qid ¼ hM; 34i in Table 1 , T ½qid^s1 ¼ fUID#1; 3g and T ½qid ¼ fUID#1; 3g, hence P ðs1jqidÞ ¼ 2=2 ¼ 100%.
To thwart the record and attribute linkages on any individual in the table T , we require every qid with a maximum length L in the anonymous table to be shared by at least a certain number of records, and the percentage of sensitive value(s) in every group cannot be too high. The privacy model, LKC-privacy [13] , reflects this intuition. 1. jT ½qidj ! K, where K > 0 is an integer representing the anonymity threshold, and 2. P ðsjqidÞ C for any s 2 S, where 0C 1 is a real number representing the confidence threshold.
The data provider specifies the thresholds L, K, and C. The maximum length L reflects the assumption of the adversary's power. LKC-privacy guarantees the probability of a successful record linkage to be 1=K and the probability of a successful attribute linkage to be C. Sometimes, we write C in percentage. LKC-privacy has several nice properties that make it suitable for anonymizing high-dimensional data. First, it only requires a subset of QID attributes to be shared by at least K records. This is a major relaxation from traditional K-anonymity, based on a very reasonable assumption that the adversary has limited power. Second, LKC-privacy generalizes several traditional privacy models. K-anonymity [3] , [4] is a special case of LKC-privacy with L ¼ jQIDj and C ¼ 100%, where jQIDj is the number of QID attributes in the data table. Confidence bounding [6] is also a special case of LKCprivacy with L ¼ jQIDj and K ¼ 1. ð; kÞ-anonymity [34] is a special case of LKC-privacy with L ¼ jQIDj, K ¼ k, and C ¼ . One instantiation of '-diversity is also a special case of LKC-privacy with L ¼ jQIDj, K ¼ 1, and C ¼ 1='. Thus, the data provider can still achieve the traditional models.
Utility Measure
The measure of information utility varies depending on the user's specified information service request and the data analysis task to be performed on the mashup data. Based on the information requirements specified by the social network data providers, we define two utility measures. First, we aim at preserving the maximal information for classification analysis. Second, we aim at minimizing the overall data distortion when the data analysis task is unknown.
In this paper, the general idea in anonymizing a table is to perform a sequence of specializations starting from the topmost general state in which each attribute has the topmost value of its taxonomy tree. We assume that a taxonomy tree is specified for each categorical attribute in QID. A leaf node represents a domain value and a parent node represents a less specific value. For numerical attributes in QID, taxonomy trees can be grown at runtime, where each node represents an interval, and each nonleaf node has two child nodes representing some optimal binary split of the parent interval [2] . Fig. 1 shows a dynamically grown taxonomy tree for Age.
A specialization, written v ! childðvÞ, where childðvÞ denotes the set of child values of v, replaces the parent value v with the child value that generalizes the domain value in a record. A specialization is valid if the resulting table still satisfies the specified LKC-privacy requirement after the specialization. A specialization is performed only if it is valid. The specialization process can be viewed as pushing the "cut" of each taxonomy tree downward. A cut of the taxonomy tree for an attribute D i , denoted by Cut i , contains exactly one value on each root-to-leaf path. Fig. 1 shows a solution cut indicated by the dashed curve representing the LKC-privacy preserved Table 2 . The specialization procedures start from the topmost cut and iteratively pushes down the cut by specializing some value in the current cut until violating the LKC-privacy requirement. In other words, the specialization process pushes the cut downward until no valid specialization is possible. Each specialization tends to increase information utility and decrease privacy because records are more distinguishable by specific values. We define two utility measures (scores) to evaluate the "goodness" of a specialization depending on the information service request requirement.
Utility Measure for Classification Analysis
For the requirement of classification analysis, we use information gain [2] to measure the goodness of a specialization. Let T ½x denote the set of records in table T generalized to the value x. Let jT ½x^clsj denote the number of records in T ½x having the class cls. Note that jT ½vj ¼ P c jT ½cj, where c 2 childðvÞ. Our selection criterion, ScoreðvÞ, is to favor the specialization v ! childðvÞ that has the maximum information gain
where EðT ½xÞ is the entropy [35] of T ½x and
Intuitively, EðT ½xÞ measures the mix of classes for the records in T ½x, and the information gain of v (or ScoreðvÞ in this case) is the reduction of the mix by specializing v into c 2 childðvÞ. For a numerical attribute, the specialization of an interval refers to the optimal binary split that maximizes information gain on the Class attribute. See [2] for details.
Utility Measure for General Data Analysis
Sometimes, the mashup data are shared without a specific task. In this case of general data analysis, we use discernibility cost [36] to measure the data distortion in the anonymous data. The discernibility cost charges a penalty to each record for being indistinguishable from other records. For each record in an equivalence group qid, the penalty is jT ½qidj. Thus, the penalty on a group is jT ½qidj 2 . To minimize the discernibility cost, we choose the specialization vchildðvÞ that maximizes the value of
over all qid containing v. Example 3 shows the computation of ScoreðvÞ in more details.
Privacy-Preserving High-Dimensional Data Mashup
Consider n data providers fProvider 1; . . . ; Provider ng, where each Provider y owns a private table T y ðUID; QID y ; S y ; ClassÞ over the same set of records. UID and Class are shared attributes among all data providers. QID y is a set of quasi-identifying attributes and S y is a set of sensitive values owned by provider y. QID y \ QID z ¼ ; and S y \ S z ¼ ; for any 1 y; z n. These providers agree to release "minimal information" to form a mashup [18] , [19] , [20] , meaning that they will follow the algorithm but may attempt to derive sensitive information from the received data.
We use an example to explain condition 3. If a record in the final table T has values F and Professional on Gender and Job, respectively. Condition 3 is violated if Provider A can learn that P rofessional in this record comes from Lawyer. Our privacy model ensures the privacy protection in the final mashup table as well as in any intermediate tables.
To ease the explanation, we present our solution in a scenario of two parties (n ¼ 2). A discussion is given in Section 4.3 to describe the extension to multiple parties.
Given a QID, there are ð jQIDj L Þ combinations of decomposed QID j with maximum size L. For any value of K and C, each combination of QID j in LKC-privacy is an instance of the ð; kÞ-anonymity problem with ¼ C and k ¼ K. Wong et al. [34] have proven that computing the optimal ð; kÞ-anonymous solution is NP-hard; therefore, computing the optimal LKC-privacy solution is also NP-hard.
SOA FOR PRIVACY-PRESERVING DATA MASHUP
We first present a service-oriented architecture (SOA) that describes the communication paths of all participating parties, followed by a privacy-preserving high-dimensional data mashup algorithm that can efficiently identify a suboptimal solution for the problem described in Definition 3.
SOA is an architectural paradigm for developing and integrating heterogeneous information systems with strict message-driven communication paradigm. Following the SOA design principles, the resulting system has several desirable properties including interoperability and loosely coupling. Interoperability refers to the capability of allowing platform-independent design of the system components based on a common understanding of service component interfaces. Loosely coupling refers to the capability of minimizing dependencies among the system components and, therefore, improving the overall flexibility, scalability, and fault tolerance of a system [37] . In the mashup system described in this paper, data sources can be dynamically composed to serve new mashup requests depending on the data analysis tasks and privacy requirements. SOA with the capabilities of interoperability and loosely coupling has become a natural choice to tackle the heterogeneity of different potential data providers.
Referring to the architecture shown in Fig. 2 , the data mashup process can be divided into two phases. In Phase I, the mashup coordinator receives an information service request from the data recipient and establishes connections with the data providers who can contribute their data to fulfill the request. In Phase II, the mashup coordinator executes the privacy-preserving algorithm to integrate the private data from multiple data providers and to deliver the final mashup data to the data recipient. Note that our proposed solution does not require the mashup coordinator to be a trusted party. Though the mashup coordinator manages the entire mashup service, our solution guarantees that the mashup coordinator does not gain more information than the final mashup data, thereby protecting the data privacy of every participant. The mashup coordinator can be any one of the data providers or an independent party. This makes our architecture practical because a trusted party is not always available in real-life mashup scenarios.
Phase I: Session Establishment
The objective of Phase I is to establish a common session context between the data recipient and the contributing data providers. An operational context is successfully established by proceeding through the steps of data recipient authentication, contributing data providers identification, session context initialization, and common requirements negotiation.
Authenticate data recipient. The mashup coordinator first authenticates a data recipient to the requested service, generates a session token for the current recipient interaction, and then identifies the data providers accessible by the data recipient. Some data providers are public and are accessible by any data recipients.
Identify contributing data providers. Next, the mashup coordinator queries the data schema of the accessible data providers to identify the data providers that can contribute data for the requested service. To facilitate more efficient queries, the mashup coordinator could prefetch data schema from the data providers (i.e., the pull model), or the data providers could update their data schema periodically (i.e., the push model).
Initialize session context. Next, the mashup coordinator notifies all contributing data providers with the session identifier. All prospective data providers share a common session context that represents a stateful presentation of information related to a specific execution of the privacypreserving mashup algorithm called PHDMashup. This algorithm will be discussed in Section 4.2. An established session context contains several attributes to identify a PHDMashup process, including the data recipient's address; the data providers' addresses and certificates; an authentication token that contains the data recipient's certificate; and a unique session identifier that uses an end-point reference (EPR) composed of the service address, a PHDMashup process identifier and runtime status information about the executed PHDMashup algorithm.
Negotiate privacy and information requirements. The mashup coordinator is responsible to communicate the negotiation of privacy and information requirements among the data providers and the data recipient. Specifically, this step involves negotiating cost, LKC-privacy requirement, sensitive information, and expected information quality. For example, in the case of classification analysis, information quality can be estimated by classification error on some testing data.
Phase II: Privacy-Preserving High-Dimensional Data Mashup
The objective of Phase II is to integrate the high-dimensional data from multiple data providers such that the final mashup data satisfies a given LKC-privacy requirement and preserves as much information as possible for the specified information requirement. Recall that Definition 3.1 specifies three requirements. Requirements 1 and 2 specify the properties of the final mashup data. Requirement 3 states that no data provider should learn more detailed information than the final mashup data during the process of integration. To satisfy requirement 3, we propose a topdown specialization approach called Privacy-preserving High-dimensional Data Mashup (PHDMashup). We first present an overview of the algorithm followed by the details of each step.
To ease the discussion, we present the algorithm in a scenario of two data providers. An extension to multiple (>2) data providers will be given in Section 4.3. Consider two private tables T A and T B with a common key UID, where Provider A holds T A and Provider B holds T B . Initially, every data provider generalizes all of its own attribute values to the topmost value according to the taxonomy trees, and maintains a cut Cut i that contains the topmost value for each attribute D i in QID. The union cut [Cut i on all attributes represents a generalized table T , denoted by T g . [Cut i also contains the set of candidates for specialization. A specialization vchildðvÞ is valid, written as IsV alidðvÞ, if the table T g still satisfies the LKC-privacy requirement after the specialization on v. At each iteration, PHDMashup identifies the winner specialization, i.e., the valid candidate that has the highest Score, among all the candidates, performs the winner specialization, and updates the Score and the IsV alid status of the new and existing candidates in the cut. PHDMashup terminates when there are no valid candidates in the cut.
Note, there is no need to further specialize a value once it becomes invalid because any further specializations also must be invalid. This antimonotonic [12] property of LKCprivacy with respect to a specialization significantly reduces the search space and ensures that the resulting solution is suboptimal.
Algorithm 1 describes the procedure of Provider A (same as Provider B). Provider A finds the local winner specialization using the utility measure discussed in Section 3.2, and communicates with Provider B to identify the global winner candidate, denoted by w. Suppose that w is local to Provider A (otherwise, the discussion below applies to Provider B). Provider A performs wchildðwÞ on its copy of [Cut i and T g . This means specializing each record t 2 T g containing w into those t The nature of the top-down approach implies that T g is always more general than the final mashup table and, therefore, does not violate requirement 3 in Definition 3.1. At each iteration, the data providers cooperate to perform the same identified specialization by communicating some count statistics information that satisfies requirement 3 in Definition 3.1. Below, we describe the key steps: find the winner candidate (Lines 4-5), perform the winner specialization (Lines 7-11), and update the score and status of candidates (Line 14). For Provider A, a local attribute refers to an attribute from T A . [20] to determine the highest Score among the participating data providers.
Perform the Winner Specialization
Suppose that the winner specialization w is local at Provider A (otherwise, replace Provider A with Provider B in the procedure). For each record t in T g containing w, Provider A accesses the raw records in T A ½t to tell how to specialize t.
To facilitate this operation, we represent T g by the data structure called Taxonomy Indexed PartitionS (TIPS). The idea is to group the raw records in T A according to their generalized records t in T g .
Definition 4.1 (TIPS)
. TIPS is a tree structure. Each node represents a generalized record over [QID j . Each child node represents a specialization of the parent node on exactly one attribute. A leaf node represents a generalized record t in T g and the leaf partition containing the raw records generalized to t, i.e., T A ½t. For a candidate x in [Cut i , P x denotes a leaf partition whose generalized record contains x, and Link x links up all partitions P x .
With TIPS, we can efficiently find all raw records generalized to x by following Link x for any candidate x in [ Cut i . To ensure that every data provider has only access to its own raw records, a leaf partition at Provider A contains only raw records from T A and a leaf partition at Provider B contains only raw records from T B . Each provider maintains a local copy of TIPS, representing the current state of the integrated table. Initially, the TIPS has only the root node representing all data records with the most general values. In each iteration, the two data providers cooperate to perform the specialization w by refining the leaf partitions P w on Link w in their own copy of TIPS. As both providers perform exactly the same specialization, both copies of TIPS are always identical after every specialization. [ Cut i is updated into fANY Gender; W hite-collar; Blue-collar; ½1-99Þg. Suppose that the second winner specialization is ½1-99Þf½1-60Þ; ½60-99Þg, which specializes the two partitions on Link ½1-99Þ , resulting in the leaf partitions in Fig. 3 .
We summarize the operations at the two data providers, assuming that the winner w is local at Provider A.
Provider A. Provider A refines each leaf partition P w on Link w into child partitions P c . Link c is created to link up the new P c 's for the same c. Add P c to every Link x other than Link w to which P w was previously linked. While scanning the records in P w , Provider A also collects the following information:
. uids for Provider B. If a record in P w is specialized to a child value c, collect the pair (uid, c), where uid is the UID value of the record. Then, Provider A sends these (uid, c) pairs to Provider B for specializing the corresponding leaf partitions there.
. Count statistics for updating Score. 1) For each c in childðwÞ: jT A ½cj, jT A ½dj, jT A ½c^clsj, jT A ½d^clsj, jT A ½c^sj, and jT A ½d^sj for every sensitive value s 2 S, where d 2 childðcÞ and cls is a class label. Refer to Section 3 for these notations. jT A ½cj (similarly jT A ½dj) is computed by P jP c j for P c on Link c . 2) For each P c on Link c : jP d j, where P d is a child partition under P c as if c is specialized. Provider B. On receiving the instruction from Provider A, Provider B creates child partitions P c in its own TIPS. At Provider Bs site, the child partitions P c contain raw records from T B . The child partitions P c are obtained by splitting P w among P c according to the (uid; c) pairs received.
Example 4. Let us revisit the first specialization in
Example 3. Provider B performs the first specialization ANY Job ! fW hite-collar; Blue-collarg on its own TIPS and then sends the following instruction to Provider A: uid#1; 3; 5; 6; 10; 11 go to the node with Blue-collar. uid#2; 4; 7; 8; 9 go to the node with White-collar. On receiving this instruction, Provider A creates the two child nodes under the root in its copy of TIPS and partitions T A ½root. In general, the data providers update their own TIPS data structures either by specializing the winning candidate on their own local attributes or by receiving specialization instructions from the other data provider. Updating TIPS is the only operation that accesses raw records in our algorithm. Subsequently, updating ScoreðxÞ (in Section 4.2.3) makes use of the count statistics without further accessing raw records. The overhead of maintaining Link x is small. For each attribute in [QID j and each leaf partition on Link w , there are at most jchildðwÞj "relinkings." Therefore, there are at most j [ QID j j Â jLink w j Â jchildðwÞj "relinkings" for performing w.
Update the Score
The key to the scalability of our algorithm is updating ScoreðxÞ and IsV alidðxÞ using the count statistics maintained in Section 4.2.2 without accessing raw records again. For any valid candidate x 2 [Cut i , its ScoreðxÞ and IsV alidðxÞ need to be updated if some qid x containing x also contains the winner candidate w in the current specialization. Updating ScoreðxÞ depends on InfoGainðxÞ or jT ½qid x j. Updating IsV alidðxÞ depends on jT ½qid x j and jT ½qid x^s j for every sensitive value s 2 S. We consider both updates below.
Updating InfoGainðxÞ. We need to compute InfoGainðcÞ the newly added c in childðwÞ. 
InfoGainðANY JobÞ ¼ EðT ½ANY JobÞ Updating IsV alidðxÞ and jT ½qid x j. Given an LKCprivacy requirement, a specialization on value x is valid (i.e., IsV alidðxÞ ¼ true) if jT ½qid j j ! K and P ðsjqid j Þ ¼ jT ½qid j^s j jT ½qid j j C for any qid j with jqid j j L containing x and for any s 2 S. The following data structure, called QuasiIdentifier Tree ðQIT Þ, can efficiently maintain these counts. For each QID j ¼ fD 1 ; . . . ; D q g, QIT j is a tree of q levels, where level i > 0 represents generalized values for D i . A root-to-leaf path represents an existing qid j on QID j in the generalized data T g . The leaf nodes store the jT ½qid j j and jT ½qid j^s j for every sensitive value s 2 S. A branch is trimmed if its jT ½qid j j ¼ 0.
Definition 4.2 (QIT).
QIT j is kept at a data provider if the data provider owns some attributes in QID j . On specializing the winner w, a data provider updates its QIT j s that contain the attribute of w: creates the nodes for the new qid j s and computes jT ½qid j j and jT ½qid j^s j for every sensitive value s 2 S. We can obtain jT ½qid j j and jT ½qid j^s j from the local copy of TIPS: jT ½qid j j ¼ P jP c j, where P c is on Link c and qid j is the generalized value on QID j for P c . jT ½qid j^s j can be computed similarly. Note that jP c j is given by the count statistics for w collected in Section 4.2.2.
Analysis
Our approach produces the same integrated table as the single data provider anonymization algorithm [13] on a joint table, and ensures that no data provider learns more detailed information about any other provider other than what they agreed to share. This claim follows from the fact that PHDMashup performs exactly the same sequence of specializations as in [13] but in a distributed manner where T A and T B are kept locally at the sources. The only information revealed to each other is [Cut j and T g at each iteration. However, such information is more general than the final mashup table that the two data providers have agreed to share.
PHDMashup (Algorithm 1) is extendable for multiple (more than two) data providers with minor changes: in Line 5, each data provider should communicate with all the other data providers for determining the winner. In Line 8, the data provider holding the winner specialization should instruct all the other data providers. In Line 10, a data provider should wait for instruction from the winner data provider. Our algorithm is based on the assumption that all the data providers are semihonest. An interesting extension would be to consider the presence of malicious and selfish data providers [29] , [38] , [39] , [40] . In such a scenario, the algorithm has to be both secure and incentive compatible.
The overhead cost of session establishment in Phase I involves creating a session link between a mashup coordinator and a data recipient, and a session link between a mashup coordinator and each contributing data provider. A session link is simply an integer value (e.g., a Job ID) and is either used to actively keep the data recipient connected or to allow for asynchronous polling for the status of a current job. The data structure size for maintaining a session of a mashup request is linear to the number of contributing data providers; therefore, the overhead is limited. In case the number of data recipients or the number of mashup requests is large, the load of the mashup coordinator can be balanced across multiple servers.
The computational cost of PHDMashup in Phase II can be summarized as follows: each iteration involves the following work: 1) Scan the records in T A ½w and T B ½w for updating TIPS and maintaining count statistics (Section 4.2.2). 2) Update QIT j , InfoGainðxÞ, and IsV alidðxÞ for affected candidates x (Section 4.2.3). 3) Send "instruction" to the remote data providers. The instruction contains only uids of the records in T A ½w or T B ½w and child values c in childðwÞ, therefore, is compact. Only the work in 1) involves accessing data records; the work in 2) makes use of the count statistics without accessing data records and is restricted to only affected candidates. This feature makes our approach scalable. We will evaluate the scalability of the algorithm on real-life data in the next section.
For the communication cost 3, each data provider communicates (Line 5 in Algorithm 1) with others to determine the global winner candidate. Thus, each data provider sends n À 1 messages, where n is the number of data providers. Then, the data provider of the winner specialization (Line 8) sends instruction to other data providers. This communication process continues for at most s times, where s is the number of valid specializations bounded by the number of distinct values in [QID j . Hence, for a given data set, the total communication cost is s Â ½nðn À 1Þ þ ðn À 1Þ ¼ s Â ðn 2 À 1Þ % Oðn 2 Þ. I f n ¼ 2, then the total communication cost is 3s. In real-life data mashup application, the number of contributing data providers for an information request is usually small.
EMPIRICAL STUDY
We implement the proposed PHDMashup in a distributed web service environment. Each data provider is running on an Intel Core2 Quad Q6600 2.4 GHz PC with 2 GB RAM connected to a LAN. The objectives of the empirical study are to evaluate the benefit of data mashup for joint data analysis, and the impacts of anonymization and dimensionality on the data quality with respect to the information requirements. We first describe the data set and the settings, followed by the results.
Due to the privacy agreement, we cannot use the raw data from the social network companies for experiments, so we employ the de facto benchmark census data set Adult [41] , which is also a real-life data set, to illustrate the performance of our proposed architecture and algorithm. The Adult data set has six numerical attributes, eight categorical attributes, and a binary Class attribute representing two income levels 50 K or >50 K. Table 3 describes each attribute. It contains 45,222 records after removing records with missing values. We model a 2-data provider scenario with two private tables T A and T B as follows: T A contains the first nine attributes, and T B contains the remaining five attributes. We consider Divorced and Separated in the attribute Marital-status as sensitive, and the remaining 13 attributes as QID. A common UID is added to both tables for joining. The taxonomy trees for all categorical attributes are from [8] .
Benefits of Mashup
A trivial yet incorrect solution to avoid privacy concerns is to not integrate the data; each data provider simply performs the classification analysis on its own attributes and releases the data mining result, such as the classifier, to the data recipient. Our first goal is to illustrate the benefit of data mashup over this trivial solution with respect to the classification requirement.
To evaluate the impact on classification quality (Case 1 in Section 3.2.1), we use all records for anonymization, build a C4.5 classifier [2] on 2/3 of the anonymized records as the training set (30,162 records), and measure the classification error on 1/3 of the anonymized records as the testing set (15,060 records). Both the training and testing steps use all 14 attributes. Lower classification error means better data quality. We collect two types of classification errors from the testing set: Mashup Classification Error (MCE) is the error on the mashup data produced by our PHDMashup algorithm. Source error (SE) is the error on individual raw data table without generalization. SE for T A , denoted by SEðAÞ, is 17.7 percent and SE for T B , denoted by SEðBÞ, is 17.9 percent. SE À MCE measures the benefit of data mashup over individual private table. approximately 1.5 percent. This experiment demonstrates the benefit of data mashup over a wide range of privacy requirements. The benefit for all test cases illustrated in Fig. 4 spans from 1.3 to 2.1 percent. The benefit decreases as L increases because more generalization is required in order to thwart the linkage attacks. In practice, the benefit is more than the accuracy consideration because our method allows the participating data providers to share data for joint data analysis, rather than sharing a classifier from each provider.
Impacts of Anonymization
Our second goal is to illustrate the impacts for achieving LKC-privacy with respect to classification analysis and general data analysis.
To evaluate the impacts on classification quality (Case 1 in Section 3.2.1), we collect several classification errors, in addition to MCE, from the testing set: Baseline Error (BE) is the error measured on all 14 raw data attributes without generalization. BE À MCE represents the cost in terms of classification quality for achieving a given LKC-privacy requirement. A naive method to avoid record and attributes linkages is to simply remove all QID attributes. Thus, we also measure Upper bound Error (UE), which is the error on the raw data with all QID attributes removed. UE À MCE represents the benefit of our method over the naive approach. The experimental results below suggest that our method PHDMashup can yield a small MCE À BE (low cost) and a large UE À MCE (high benefit). Fig. 5 , the cost MCE À BE spans from 0.4 percent to 1.7 percent and the benefit UE À MCE spans from 8.2 to 9.5 percent. This result illustrates that the cost of anonymization is low and the benefit of anonymization is high, suggesting that accurate classification and privacy protection can coexist even for a wide range of anonymity threshold K. Typically, there are redundant classification patterns in the data. Though generalization may eliminate some useful patterns, other patterns emerge to help the classification task. Fig. 6 , the cost MCE À BE spans from 1 to 1.7 percent and the benefit UE À MCE spans from 8.2 to 8.9 percent. This result suggests that the MCE is insensitive to the change of the confidence threshold C, implying that it does not cost much to thwart attribute linkages.
To evaluate the costs on general analysis quality (Case 2 in Section 3.2.2), we use all records for generalization and measure the mashup discernibility ratio (MDR) on the final mashup data
MDR is the normalized discernibility cost [36] , with 0 MDR 1. The lower MDR indicates the higher data quality. Fig. 7 depicts the MDR for the adversary's prior knowledge L ¼ 2, L ¼ 4, and L ¼ 6 with confidence threshold C ¼ 20% and anonymity threshold K ranging from 20 to 100. For all test cases in Fig. 7 , MDR spans from 0.02 to 4.92 percent, suggesting that it costs very little to achieve a given LKC-privacy requirement even for a wide range of adversary's prior knowledge L and anonymity threshold K. Similar to the measure on classification error, MDR is insensitive to the change of the confidence threshold C. The result in Fig. 7 also shows that MDR does not increase monotonically with respect to the increase K because PHDMashup employs a greedy approach for selecting a specialization at each iteration. The greedy approach can guarantee the identified solution is suboptimal but not necessarily global optimal. Although a global optimal solution is desirable, finding the optimal solution significantly degrades the efficiency and scalability of the method, which are also important requirements for real-life data mashup.
Impacts of Dimensionality
Our third goal is to evaluate the impact of dimensionality, i.e., the number of QID attributes, on the data quality with respect to the distortion metric proposed in [42] . Each time a categorical value is generalized to the parent value in a record, there is one unit of distortion. For a numerical attribute, if a value v is generalized to an interval ½a; bÞ, there is ðb À aÞ=ðf2 À f1Þ unit of distortion for a record containing v, where ½f1; f2Þ is the full range of the numerical attribute. The distortion is normalized by the number of records. The distortion per record (DP R) is separately computed for categorical attributes and numerical attributes, denoted by DP R Categorical and DP R Numerical, respectively. Fig. 8 depicts the DP R Categorical and DP R Numerical for the adversary's prior knowledge L ¼ 4 with confidence threshold C ¼ 20% and anonymity threshold K ¼ 60 for 4, 7, 10, and 13 QID attributes. DP R Categorical spans from 3.98 to 11.24 and DP R Numerical spans from 0.62 to 4.05. This result illustrates that the distortion per record generally increases as the number of QID attributes increases because more generalizations are required in order to achieve the same LKC-privacy requirement.
Efficiency and Scalability
Our method takes at most 20 seconds for every previous experiment. Out of the 20 seconds, approximately 8 seconds is spent on initializing network sockets, reading data records from disk, and writing the generalized data to disk. The actual costs for data anonymization and network communication are relatively low.
Our other claim is the scalability of handling large data sets by maintaining count statistics instead of scanning raw records. We evaluate this claim on an enlarged version of the Adult data set. We combine the training and testing sets, giving 45,222 records, and for each original record r in the combined set, we create À 1 variations of r, where > 1 is the blowup scale. Together with original records, the enlarged data set has Â 45;222 records. Fig. 9 depicts the runtime from 200,000 to 1 million records for L ¼ 4, K ¼ 20, C ¼ 100%. The total runtime for anonymizing 1 million records is 132 seconds, where 50 seconds are spent on reading raw data, 58 seconds are spent on anonymization, and 24 seconds are spent on writing the anonymous data. Our algorithm is scalable due to the fact that we use the count statistics to update the Score, and thus it only takes one scan of data per iteration to anonymize the data. As the number of records increases, the total runtime increases linearly.
SUMMARY
The experiments verified several claims about the PHDMashup algorithm. First, data mashup leads to improved information utility compared to the information utility separately available on each private table. Second, PHDMashup achieves a broad range of LKC-privacy requirements without significantly sacrificing the information utility. The cost for anonymization is low, and the benefit is significant. Third, our proposed architecture and method are scalable for large data sets. Our work provides a practical solution to the problem of high-dimensional data mashup with the dual goals of information sharing and privacy protection.
CONCLUSION AND LESSON LEARNED
We implement a data mashup application for the online advertising industry in social networks, and generalize their privacy and information requirements to the problem of privacy-preserving data mashup for the purpose of joint data analysis on the high-dimensional data. We formalize this problem as achieving the LKC-privacy on the mashup data without revealing more detailed information in the process. We present a solution and evaluate the benefits of data mashup and the impacts of generalization. Compared to classic secure multiparty computation, a unique feature of our method is to allow data sharing instead of only result sharing. This feature is especially important for data analysis that requires user interaction. Being able to share data records would permit such exploratory data analysis and explanation of results. Finally, we would like to share our experience of collaboration with industrial practitioners. In general, industrial practitioners prefer a simple privacy model that is intuitive to understand and to explain to their clients, such as LKC-privacy. Often, their primary concern is whether or not the anonymous data are still effective for data analysis; solutions that solely satisfy some privacy requirement are insufficient. The industry demands anonymization methods that can preserve information for various data analysis tasks.
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